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This article takes a critical look at the historiography of development in 
Guyana as it appears in archival materials and the primary (governmental and non-
governmental reports) and secondary (scholarly) literature. I ask why development 
schemes were so heavily focused on drainage and irrigation (D&I), how this focus 
was justified, and whether there is another way to think about the possibilities for 
development in Guyana in the future. It is argued that, in Guyana, various 
development actors attempt to relocate what they perceive to be the previous 
regimes failures through discourses on racial and political difference. Their 
solutions to these problems are often subsequently portrayed as corrections to the 
failures of the previous regime despite the significant repetition of certain themes. 
Finally, it offers insight into how these development projects might be reconsidered. 
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“One of [British Guiana’s] fundamental needs is the improvement of 
the main drainage system in the coastal areas without which no 
progress towards the adoption of a better system of agriculture will 
be possible.” – Extract from secret despatch from Sir Wilfrid Jackson 
to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 2 April, 1940. 
 
“Lack of maintenance of the [drainage and irrigation] system is the 
main constraint mentioned by farmers and is the most frequently 
cited reason for land abandonment” – Region VI Sub-Regional Land 




When Karl Marx famously stated that “all great world historic facts and 
personages appear, so to speak, twice […] the first time as tragedy, the second time 
as farce” (Marx, 1852) he seemingly failed to account for the necessary double role 
that the effects of these reappearances would play. For many, the reappearance of 
historic facts is always, at least in part, a tragedy. This is especially true when 
experiences of “underdevelopment” collide with relatively recent experiences of 
colonialism and are read as mutually-occurring processes (cf. Rodney, 1972). As a 
result, the third-world development experience requires an understanding of the 
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lasting political, economic, and social effects of colonialism in its many forms. It has 
been made clear by Allan Pred (2004) and others (e.g., Haraway, 1989; Mbembe, 
2001; Stoler, 2013; Trouillot, 1995) that history (and particularly colonial history) is 
not a sequence of events that have happened only in the past with no bearing on the 
present, nor is it ever a complete and factual representation of what has happened. 
Instead, history is an on-going process that both structures and is structured by the 
present and by the systems of power when events were transcribed and when they 
are interpreted. That is to say, history is an on-going process of transcription and 
translation. 
For Guyana, a country on South America’s Caribbean rimland, this means 
many things but, importantly, it has meant that development schemes focusing on 
increasing agricultural production have been transcribed and read in ways that allow 
for repetition, not only in their overarching goals (e.g. to grow more food 
domestically) but also in the ways in which they plan on achieving these goals. This 
has meant expansion of the country’s drainage and irrigation (D&I) system. In each 
decade beginning with the 1940s, references to major coastal D&I projects can be 
found throughout the colonial and postcolonial archives as well as in the other 
governmental and non-governmental literatures on economic development in 
Guyana. In this article, I ask why development schemes were so heavily focused on 
D&I, how this focus was justified, and whether there is another way to think about 
the possibilities for a more sustainable development in Guyana’s future. To answer 
this, I critically examine the historiography of development in Guyana as it appears 
in archival materials and the primary and secondary (scholarly) literature. I argue that, 
in Guyana, various development actors attempt to relocate what they perceive to be 
the previous regimes failures through discourses on racial and political difference. 
Their solutions to these problems are often subsequently portrayed as corrections to 
the failures of the previous regime. What results is a nearly complete repetition of the 
schemes they claim have failed. Because this model of development rests on the 
breakdown of the previous attempts, it is inherently unsustainable. To overcome the 
challenges associated with this repetition-based system of development, new ways of 
understanding the politics of infrastructure and the vibrancy of nature are required. 
By viewing D&I infrastructure as political, and by giving nature agency, sustainable 
development practice will be able to more adequately account for them in their 
design and implementation. 
I am not the first to note the repetition of economic factors of development 
in Guyana. Kenneth Jameson (1980) spoke of the “repetition to most measures of 
performance in the economy,” particularly as they dealt with international trade deals 
with the IMF (p. 77). While Jameson offers important insights into the role of 
transnational trade agreements in the postcolonial era, his work does not speak 
directly to how these affected development initiatives on the coast. That is, while he 
looks at the goals of development from a multinational financial perspective, he does 
not explore the means by which these goals are to be met. This paper takes the idea 
of repetition further. It is not just that development’s ends and the actors are being 
repeated, but the means are as well. 
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2. Situating Guyana 
 
Before delving into the developmental historiography, it is important to 
understand a few, somewhat unique, facets of Guyana’s history, and thus its present 
state. This is the historical geography of Guyana’s population density, the country’s 
reason for relying so heavily on drainage and irrigation, and the political conditions 
Guyana has experienced through its history. While many authors have focused on 
certain of these aspects in regards to Guyana’s development, often mixing them (e.g. 
Hintzen, 1989; Hope, 1985; Mistry et. al., 2009; Pierce, 1984; Williams, 1991; etc.), 
there has yet to be what might be called a historical political ecology of Guyana. I 
attempt to outline one below, but it is not meant to be in-depth. 
 Currently home to 90 per cent of the country’s population, the coastal plain 
remained largely uninhabited until permanent colonial settlement of the region in the 
eighteenth century (Evans & Meggars, 1960). 2 The plain itself sits largely below sea 
level on nearly impermeable clay/silt soil and granite bedrock (Williams and 
Johnson-Bola, 2009). Aside from a few areas of higher elevation scattered 
throughout, it was historically inhospitable due to the constant inundation and poor 
drainage resulting from its low elevation and the inability of water to escape through 
soil and bedrock into the aquifer. As a result, indigenous populations settled further 
inland and only ventured to the coast on occasion to work for or trade with the 
colonialists (Rodway, 1912; see also Williams, 2003). 
Originally a Dutch colony, the land along the coast had to be “reclaimed” 
using a complex system of levees and canals before being settled. The initial 
construction and continued colonial maintenance of infrastructure was by African 
slave labor and later indentured labor from Portugal, China, Africa, Indonesia, and 
India (Rodney, 1981). Regardless of the elevation in comparison to sea level, the 
most populated areas remain those that have been reclaimed for use in the plantation 
economy along the northern coastal plain with 39 percent of the population and 43 
percent of the GDP on land that is considered to be at serious risk of flooding 
(Hickey and Weis, 2012). As a result, the majority of the current Guyanese 
population live in an almost entirely built environment; an environment which is 
only partially connected to the historical ecological processes of the region prior to 
colonialism, and one which is tied directly to the colonial-agricultural export 
economy. 
The built landscape of the Guyanese coast was designed specifically for the 
development of a plantation agriculture system with sugar production in mind 
(Rodney, 1981). The trenches to drain rainwaters and divert flooding from the 
country’s many rivers doubled as a system of irrigation and transport for cane fields 
along the coast (Jenkins 1871). The trenches also acted as logical boundaries for the 
various plantations that made up the coastal environment and currently, along with 
the rivers, help to define the boundaries of the country’s coastal Neighbourhood 
Democratic Councils. The seacoast is protected from intrusion by a large sea wall 
broken up by water management control devices, which drain the canals via gravity 
                                                
2 It is possible that there had been some settlement on the coast in prehistoric Guyana and 
settlement upstream, but what were to become the most populated areas were seemingly 
uninhabited. For more on pre-Contact archaeology of the region see Williams, 2003. 
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feed at low tide. In some areas, mechanical drainage (in the form of pumps) is used 
so that water can be pumped out any time, but these are not as common, existing 
primarily on the largest plantations only (Hickey & Weis, 2012). Since water on much 
of the coast drains naturally to the north (i.e. toward the sea, where the largest 
plantations and the capital city of Georgetown are located), large drainage 
conservancies were built slightly inland as well to keep the draining water from 
backing up to the point of running into the seawall and causing flooding (Hickey & 
Weis, 2012). This does little when heavy rains cause flooding in the coastal areas to 
the north during the rainy season and the water has nowhere to escape (see, e.g. 
Vaughn 2013). The impact of such flooding is felt especially in the city of 
Georgetown, which has been built up massively since the planning and inception of 
original D&I system (see Hickey & Weis, 2012; Pelling, 1999). 
Aside from Georgetown, the remainder of the coast is made up of a 
patchwork of small villages connected by a levee-top roadway. These villages are the 
remnants of the plantation system and bear the names of the plantations that once 
occupied that space. The houses are in the same spaces as the plantation worker 
houses and much of the labor force works in the sugar and rice fields that were once 
a part of the plantation agricultural system. They are a part of what Ann Stoler (2013) 
has called “imperial debris,” the ‘protracted imperial processes that saturate the 
subsoil of people’s lives and persist, sometimes subjacently, over a longer durée’ (p. 
5).3 Each village, with its associated fields and canals, act as a reminder of the history 
and legacy of this system as well as the tensions between life and water which exist 
along the coast. 
The period leading up to and immediately following independence brought 
with it a new way that Guyana’s built agricultural landscape would become 
politicized. Though it started as a broad Marxist front united by a history of colonial 
exploitation, the PPP would soon divide along racial lines with the urban, primarily 
Afro-Guyanese portion, leaving to form the People’s National Congress (PNC) led 
by Forbes Burnham, while the rural, mostly Indo-Guyanese base, stayed with Cheddi 
Jagan (see Hintzen, 1989). Though the two political parties were approximately the 
same size, the PPP maintained a more active political base that allowed it to win all 
of the pre-independence, tutelage era elections. However, leader Cheddi Jagan’s ties 
to the Soviet Union provoked US intervention that would lead to Forbes Burnham 
becoming the first independence-era president (Rabe 2005). The now geographically 
divided political base would have divergent interests, not only in how terms of how 
the economy should be managed, but also of the importance of D&I infrastructure 
expansion and maintenance. The PNC would remain in power under Burnham until 
his death in 1985 and would lose the 1988 election to the PPP, inverting at least 
some aspects of Guyana’s racially bifurcated political system. 
  
                                                
3 I think it is important to recognize that it is problematic to call the spaces in which people 
live ‘debris.’ Despite this, the idea remains a useful to think about why people live in the 
places they live. 
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3. Infrastructure Expansion, Development, and 
Decolonization 
 
 The victories of Marxism and the global processes of decolonization (and the 
corollary process of development) after World War II had a profound effect on 
Guyana. Guyana’s first major trade union movement (which consisted primarily of 
agricultural workers) coincided with the creation of the first specifically 
developmental discourse globally (see PPP, n.d.; Escobar, 1995). Occurring 
alongside all of this shifting in the global and local political economies was a 
reinvestment in agricultural industry as a means to alleviate labor unrest through the 
economic stabilization of the colony as a whole. According to the 1955 Annual 
Report of the colonial government, the total expenditure on agricultural 
development, including D&I expansion and repair, between 1951 and 1955 was 
BWI$8,678,912, or around 12.5 percent of total development expenditure (British 
Guiana, 1955). The 1959 Annual Report stated that the D&I system, including sea 
defenses, required BWI$11 million, 4  which was more than half of the total 
development expenditure for the year (British Guiana, 1959). The goal of this 
development was to produce food (specifically rice) for the global market to feed 
“the progressive increase in population”5 while ostensibly also increasing national 
income and prosperity (British Guiana, 1959). 
Many of the plans set out by the colonial government during the 1940s and 
which were to be carried out through the 1950s never came fully to fruition (though 
many others did, at least according to the Colonial Report of 1955; see British 
Guiana 1955). Happening simultaneously to the new development and expansion of 
water control systems was a focus on increasing rice production along the coast. A 
1941 report from the Director of Agriculture in British Guiana mentions a “Grow 
More Food Campaign” that, in part, rested on increases in rice production, but failed 
ostensibly due to weather constraints – specifically a lack of rainfall (British Guiana, 
1941). The 1944 Drainage and Irrigation Scheme map and supplement released by 
the Bureau of Publicity and Information (BPI) mentions that water shortages were a 
major part of the expansion of the D&I system (BPI, 1944). Rice is the only crop 
mentioned by name in the supplement and has a whole page dedicated to how the 
expansion will aid the industry. Sugar, long a staple crop and a source of considerable 
power within Guyana’s unions, is not mentioned. The projects culminated with the 
creation of the Black Bush Polder land settlement scheme in the early 1960s which 
reclaimed 27,000 acres of land for rice production and population settlement along a 
previously unusable part of the coast (Standing & Sukdeo, 1977). These projects 
were deemed failures, in part due to climatological “factors which led to crop failure 
in 1976 [and] demoralised most of the farmers, who subsequently drifted away, 
mostly back to Georgetown” (Standing & Sukdeo, 1977, p. 312). 
A 2011 report from the Guyana Ministry of Agriculture titled “Food and 
Nutrition Security Strategy for Guyana” (FNSS) continues the emphasis on the rice 
                                                
4 This is about £105,000,000 or 2013 US$170,173,500. However, since the currency no 
longer exists there is some difficulty in converting it. 
5 The quote comes from an ad placed at the beginning of a number of issues of the official 
agricultural journal of Guyana, Timheri, in the 1950s. 
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and sugar industries and notes the role of the deficincies of the current D&I system. 
A part of maintaining rice production and keeping its costs low is the creation of the 
Agriculture Support Services Project, (ASSP) “which aims to increase rural incomes 
by increasing the efficiency of agricultural production” (Ministry of Agriculture, 
2011, p. 9). Increasing efficiency, and “rural incomes,” is directly tied to the 
maintenance of the D&I system which also falls under the control of the ASSP as a 
part of rehabillitation projects which began in 2009 under the Agricultural Export 
Diversification Program (ADP). These projects, while a part of the FNSS, are also a 
part of the 2006 National Competitiveness Strategy, which shared many of the same 
goals. A partial goal of these projects is to enhance Guyana’s food security while also 
increasing the country’s food sovereignty and agricultural exports (Ministry of 
Agriculture, 2011). 
In 2008, the Ministry of Agriculture furthered these efforts with the 
establishment of the ‘Grow More Food Campaign’ (Ministry of Agriculture, 2011, p. 
8). This campaign, despite its nominal allusion to its 1940s counterpart, encourages 
“households to become involved in backyard gardening” and thus removes a portion 
of the burden of project failure from the state and places it within the households. A 
similar plan had been inacted before in relation to structual adjustments programs 
(SAPs) which emerged in the 1980s as part of Guyana’s requirements to re-enter the 
IMF (Ferguson, 1995; Pelling, 1999). One of the goals of the SAPs was the 
democratization and liberalization of development in the country and, as a result, 
there was an increase in petit agriculture as the FNSS and current “Grow More Food 
Campaign” suggest. According to Mark Pelling (1999), though, many of those who 
had engaged in petit agriculture during that period had given up due to losses 
resulting from a general failure of the D&I system. The solution, which in part was 
intended to address the failures of the state-led development in the previous thirty 
years, failed at the hands of the still state-maintained D&I system. As Pelling (1999) 
shows, some of the least vulnerable to the effects of flooding on the Guyanese coast 
were the informal (i.e. squatter) housing settlements that attempted to live outside of 
the official, state-sanctioned housing system. He argues that this may have been 
partly the result of grassroots communal action taken by these groups (Pelling, 1999). 
The state had failed the market-led system and the market failed to address the short-
comings of the state. 
Given this, it would seem that Guyana has learned partially from its past 
while still re-enacting the schemes it seeks to correct. D&I are scantly mentioned in 
the 2011 Food and Nutrition Security Strategy. However, the National Land Use 
Plan released in 2013 goes into much more detail on the role of D&I systems, not 
only in the “Grow More Food Campaign,” but also in developmental plans in 
general. This includes “The development of new D&I areas (particularly for rice)” 
that will undoubtedly result in the reclamation of the remaining “unusable” coastal 
system, harkening back to the development of the Black Bush Polder scheme in the 
1960s, which has its own contentious socio-political history (Burrowes, 1984; 
Government of Guyana, 2013, p. 11). The land use plan also mentions plans to 
rehabilitate the Canals Polders D&I system which, if its near-constant mentioning in 
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official reports published in the British Guiana Gazette6 are any indication, was a 
major area of interest in the 1950s. The reason areas like Canals Polders and other 
parts of the D&I need work is relegated to the negligence of the past. These are 
required, according to the local development discourse, for continued agricultural 
development, including massively increasing rice production. The land-use plan 
mentions “historically poor maintenance” as one of the primary reasons for the large 
amount of unused land in these areas, putting one idea before the other when it 
would perhaps be best to think about them as mutually reinforcing (Government of 
Guyana, 2013, p. 99). How can one say with any certainty whether the land is unused 
due to poor maintenance or that poor maintenance is the result of lack of need? If 
one is more true than the other, what made it so, and how is this to be avoided this 
time around? 
Development historiography places the blame for lack of development on 
past practices without recognition that the historicity of these claims is potentially 
problematic. In development discourse in the region, the colonial government and 
the nominally socialist regime that followed it failed to maintain the infrastructural 
system that would have allowed Guyana to prosper (Munslow, 1998). This ignores 
the fact that, for the majority of Guyanese, the country has never been particularly 
prosperous regardless of how well the system was or was not maintained. However, 
we can also see that the plans put in place are largely the same as those which are 
described as being at fault for the current conditions. The role of the state has 
changed in the different “Grow More Food Campaigns” but the methods and goals, 
when viewed in a larger context, remain largely the same. Growing more food no 
longer means just an intensification of rice production but also an increase in petit 
agriculture so that more rice can be exported—similar means to reach a similar end. 
The ideas and planning have not actually changed significantly over the course of 
several decades; they have simply swapped the names of the actors around. 
The D&I system has been and largely remains the cornerstone of agricultural 
development in Guyana. Without it, one cannot imagine life on the coastal plain. 
Perhaps that is where some of the problem lies. The need for a functioning drainage 
system to populate the coast is a result of historical paths which make populating the 
coast a necessity. The result has been a constant search for solutions to coastal 
problems as well as a constant reference to the D&I system and the need to expand 
coastal agriculture to support it. This raises an important question that I think must 
be considered, especially in light of the potential impacts of sea level rise and 
increasingly volatile weather patterns associated with climate change: what does a 
Guyana without a coast look like? This is almost impossible to imagine no matter 
how likely of a scenario it may be. This is particularly true when viewing Guyana’s 
future from a position which ignores the problems of the present in order to place 
the blame in the past. 
  
                                                
6 The Gazette was a monthly report that outlined the administrative happenings in the 
colony and would include announcements of policy, listings of recent arrests, government 
property sales, etc. 
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3. The Impacts of Developmental Historiography and 
Sustainable Development 
 
This article makes two important points. First, development discourse is a 
historiographical discourse, and the ability of development projects to take hold 
depends on a certain representation and understanding of the past, regardless of the 
historicity of those claims. Second, in the case of Guyana and other postcolonial 
agricultural states, these representations are themselves a product of what might be 
envisioned as an always inchoate development process. That is, reptitious 
development is self-defeating. New development projects are directly respondent to 
those that have passed. The projects repeat themselves in ways that, through certain 
discursive formations, appear to always be new and emergent rather than 
reimaginings of previous projects. Even then, they never truly develop completely 
before the next wave comes in to wash them away. As the threat of sea level rise and 
the volatile weather patterns associated with climate change become more imminent, 
it becomes increasingly important that countries seriously consider the impacts of 
climate change alongside development initiatives. 
Recent scholarship on climate change in Guyana (e.g. Vaughn, 2013) has 
noted a discursive shift in the politics of vulnerability since the 2005 floods, but this 
shift in language may in fact obscure the repetition this article has sought to expose. 
Hickey and Weis (2012) have laid out a detailed analysis of Guyana’s infrastructural 
issues related to climate adaptation, mitigation, and the D&I system, but their main 
argument falls within the realm of what disaster sociologist Lee Clarke (2006) calls 
‘probabilistic thinking.’ In this mode of thought, risk management is handled based 
on what will most likely happen rather than what could happen. As a result, populations 
remain at risk because risk planning fails to account for chain reactions, secondary 
effects, or, in the case of climate change, rapid shifts in the predicted impacts. While 
a system that ‘centres on rehabilitating and strengthening the crucial sea and river 
defences and drainage and irrigation system’ will in all likelihood provide some level 
of risk mitigation, it keeps a relatively large population tied to a potentially volatile 
coastal plain (Hickey & Weis, 2012, p. 72). This is presumably done for their own 
good, for economic development, through increased export in their agriculture and 
rice sectors—but who really benefits here? With decades of research on utilizing 
interior soils and an abundance of fresh water that could easily provide for a large 
population, why does the coast remain the focus of developmental schemes7? Is this 
sustainable? Is there a viable alternative? 
In presenting this research a a simple question was posed to me, why not just 
move people away from the coast? There are a number of issues there, but regardless 
of this the idea still replays another idea of Guyana’s development history, which saw 
Amerindian groups displaced from their land in the name of progress (see Hennessy, 
2013; Mistry et. al. 2009) or which saw the movement of peoples away from the 
coast to take part in economic (and agricultural) diversification (David, 1969; 
Standing & Sukdeo, 1977). It is also important to consider, as Mark Pelling (2012) 
                                                
7 See, e.g. discussion in (Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc., 1974) for an early history of this, 
my own archival research at the University of Florida confirms not only important aspects of 
the history of development in the interior, but also that such research has continued. 
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has, that ‘flood control projects actually serve to encourage floodplain development’ 
(p. 77). As development occurs in the coastal plain and population increases, not 
only will more people come under currently existing threats, but risk will increase as 
more areas become impermeable and the drainage system becomes more taxed as a 
result. In short, the D&I-as-development and D&I-as-mitigation, while compatible 
and logical sentiments, are not sustainable in relation to the often non-considered 
possibilities of the future. 
It is a challenging and troubling proposition to ask the question of what 
might be done to make development in Guyana more sustainable. The D&I 
infrastructure certainly needs to be updated, repaired, and, often times and in many 
places, replaced. The problem is thus not in existing developmental means but in the 
failure of these means to fulfill their promises of increased human security. This can 
be partially linked to the fact that projects have the potential to hurt economic 
incomes through the disruption of farming practices and therefore never come fully 
to fruition (see Marks & Ellis, 2013). The means, here, are used to reach an end 
which is to provide not just environmental security but, and primarily, economic security. 
If the means continously disrupts economic processes, it faces a contradiction in its 
own logic that must be overcome. 
This points to a larger issue: the D&I system becomes viewed as somehow 
separate from the people who live within it. It is presented as asocial, and ahistorical. 
Its history only exists as a tool for social actors to manipulate in different ways to 
advance social ends rather than as something which may be able to inform future 
development. Infrastructure becomes a means or a burden without taking into 
account local affective understandings of it. Affective not only in the meanings 
ascribed to it through memory, but also in the ways in which the history and politics 
of the infrastructure itself shape Guyanese identity. As Langdon Winner (1989) puts 
it, 
“In our accustomed way of thinking technologies are seen as neutral tools 
that can be used well or poorly, for good, evil, or something in between. But we 
usually do not stop to inquire whether a given device might have been designed and 
built in such a way that it produces a set of consequences logically and temporally 
prior to any of its professed uses. […] If our moral and political language for evaluating 
technology includes only categories having to do with tools and uses, if it does not 
include attention to the meaning of the designs and arrangements of our artifacts, 
then we will be blinded to much that is intellectually and practically crucial” (p. 25, 
original emphasis). 
Drainage and irrigation on Guyana’s coast is a technology, no doubt, and it is 
a technology with political implications ingrained in its history. Without the colonial 
history of agricultural production, the continued development debates in Guyana 
would likely not be necessary. The infrastructure is therefore a technology not just of 
agriculture, but of the human trafficking that existed with the creation of this space 
as an agricultural region. Its politics take many forms and many meanings, ranging 
from histories of colonial extraction, slavery, indentureship, and the violence of these 
systems, to the racial politics of decolonization, a racially bifurcated political system, 
and the politics of global capitalism and the promises and problems that come with 
it. 
Is it possible to relocate the impetus of D&I development toward an 
understanding of D&I (and water, sugar, rice, and rain) as a relational aspect that, on 
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its own, has a need to survive? Implicit in the nature of the question is an important 
way of reimagining development. Jane Bennett (2010) suggests that scholars “take 
seriously […] the capacity of things – edibles, commodities, storms, metals – not 
only to impede or block the will and designs of humans but also to act as quasi 
agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, and tendancies of there own,” (p. 
viii). If this is done, what changes about the development project in Guyana or 
globally? If the inanimate world is understood to have agency, then the only way to 
proceed with development is to understand its “trajectories, propensities, and 
tendancies” and take an active role in alleviating people from the risk caused by 
them. In order for development to be sustainable, it must be led by the individuals 
who have lifetimes and generations of experience with the attitudes and 
understandings of what is necessary to make life possible and viable; take seriously 
the knowledges gleened from a lifetime of struggle with and against these new vital-
yet-material aspects of everyday life. 
The goal is not to foreclose on the possibility of functional and sustainable 
development within the existing system nor to place the prospects for a more 
humanistic development into the future, but rather to cast new light on the 
combined limitations of the state and the market to the functioning of development. 
Additionally, repetition does not always have negative effects. As anthropologist Jean 
Rahier (2013) suggests, “what is repeated is always a previous temporality, which was 
itself already a repetition. And it is because they represent preceding periods that 
repetitions incarnate creativity, at the very same time that they give some illusion of 
return, of recurrence. But one should not be mistaken. A manifestation never has the 
same value twice” (p.96). 
  
Consilience Mullenite: Guyana’s Coastal Drainage 
Bibliography  
 
Bennett, J. (2010). Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Durham: Duke 
University Press. 
 
British Guiana. (1941). Administration Report of the Director of Agriculture for the Year 
1940. Georgetown: The Argosy Company, Limited. 
 
British Guiana. (1955). Colonial Report of British Guiana. London: Her Majesty’s 
Stationary Office. 
 
British Guiana. (1959). Colonial Report of British Guiana. London: Her Majesty’s 
Stationary Office. 
 
Bureau of Publicity and Information. (1944). British Guiana Drainage and Irrigation 
Schemes. Map and Supplement. 
 
Burrowes, R. (1984). The Wild Coast: An Account of Politics in Guyana. Cambridge: 
Schenkman Publishing Company. 
 
Clarke, L. (2006). Worst Cases: Terror and Catastrophe in the Popular Imagination. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
David, W.L. (1969). The Economic Development of Guyana 1953–1964. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
 
Escobar, A. (1995). Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third 
World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Evans, C. and Meggars, B.J. (1960). Archaeological Investigations in British Guiana. 
Washington: US Government Printing Office. 
 
Ferguson, T. (1995). Structural Adjustment and Good Governance: The Case of Guyana. 
Georgetown, Guyana: Public Affairs Consulting Enterprise.  
 
Government of Guyana (2013). Guyana National Land Use Plan. Georgetown: Guyana 
Lands and Surveys Commission. 
 
Haraway, D. (1989). Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern 
Science. New York: Routledge.  
 
Hennesey, L.A. (2013). ‘Re-Placing Indigenous Territory: Villigization and the 
Transformation of Amerindian Environments Under “Cooperative 
Socialism” in Guyana.’ Annals of the Association of American Geographers 103: 
1242–65. 
 
Hickey, C. and Weis, T. (2012). ‘The Challenge of Climate Change Adaptation in 
Consilience Mullenite: Guyana’s Coastal Drainage 
Guyana.’ Climate and Development 4: 66–74. 
 
Hintzen, P. (1989). The Costs of Regime Survival: Racial Mobilization, Elite Domination, and 
Control of the State in Guyana and Trinidad. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Hope, K. (1978). The Post-War Planning Experience in Guyana. Tempe, Az.: Center for 
Latin American Studies, Arizona State University 
 
Hope, K. (1985). Guyana: Politics and Development in an Emergent Socialist State. Oakville: 
Mosaic Press. 
 
Jameson, K. (1980). ‘An Intermediate Regime in Historical Context: the Case of 
Guyana.’ Development and Change 11: 77-95. 
 
Marks, M.G. and L.A. Ellis. (2013). ‘Delays in Agricultural Infrastructure Projects in 
Guyana: Causes and Proposed Solutions.’ The West Indian Journal of Engineering 
36: 79–85. 
 
Marx, K. “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.” Marxist Internet Archive. 




Mbembe, A. (2001). On the Postcolony. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Ministry of Agriculture. (2011). Food and Nutrition Security Strategy for Guyana. 
Georgetown: Government of Guyana. 
 
Mistry, J, A Berardi, and D McGregor. (2009). Natural Resource Management and 
Development Discourses in the Caribbean: reflections on the Guyanese and 
Jamaican Experience. Third World Quarterly 30: 969-989.  
 
Munslow, B (1998). Guyana: Microcosm of Sustainable Development Challenges. Aldershot, 
England: Ashgate. 
 
Pelling, M. (1997). ‘What Determines Vulnerability to Floods; a Case Study in 
Georgetown, Guyana.’ Environment and Urbanization 9: 203–26.  
 
Pelling, M. (1999). ‘The Political Ecology of Flood Hazard in Urban Guyana.’ 
Geoforum 30: 249–61.  
 
Pelling, M. (2003). ‘Toward a Political Ecology of Urban Environmental Risk: The 
Case of Guyana.’ In Political Ecology: An Integrative Approach to Geography and 
Environment-Development Studies, Zimmerer, K. and T. Bassett (eds), 73–93. 
New York: The Guilford Press. 
 
People’s Progressive Party (n.d.). ‘History of the PPP.’ http://www.ppp-
Consilience Mullenite: Guyana’s Coastal Drainage 
civic.org/history/historyppp.htm (last accessed September 22, 2014) 
 
Pierce, P. (1984). Non-capitalist Development: The struggle to nationalize the Guyanese sugar 
industry. London: Rowman & Allanheld. 
 
Pred, A. (2004). The Past is Not Dead: Facts, Fictions, and Enduring Racial Stereotypes. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
 
Rabe, S. (2005) U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press 
 
Rahier, J. (2013). King for Three Days: The Play of Race and Gender in an Afro-Ecuadorian 
Festival. Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois Press. 
 
Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc. (1974). Guyanas Foodcrop Systems: An Analysis for 
development planning. USAID GY-630.9881-N274. PN-AAA-712. 
 
Rodney, W. (1972). How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. London: Bogle-L’Ouverture 
Publications. 
 
Rodney, W. (1981). A History of the Guyanese Working People, 1881-1905. Baltimore: 
The John Hopkins University Press.  
 
Rodway, J. (1912). Guiana: British, Dutch, and French. New York: Charles Scribners 
Sons. 
 
Standing, G. and F. Sukdeo. (1977). ‘Labour Migration and Development in 
Guyana.’ International Labor Review 116: 303–13. 
 
Stoler, A. L. (2013). ‘“The Rot Remains:” From Ruins to Ruination.’ In Imperial 
Debris: On Ruin and Ruination, Stoler, A.L. (ed.) 1–35. Durham: Duke 
University Press. 
 
Sultana, F. (2014). ‘Doing Development as a Critical Development Scholar.’ Third 
World Quarterly 35: 516-519. 
 
Trouillot, M-R. (1995). Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History. Boston: 
Beacon Press. 
 
Vaughn, S.E. (2013). ‘Between a Promise and a Trench: Citizenship, Vulnerability, 
and Climate Change in Guyana.’ PhD Diss., Columbia University. 
 
Viotti da Costa, E. (1994). Crowns of Glory, Tears of Blood: The Demerara Slave Rebellion of 
1823. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Williams, B. (1991). Stains on My Name, War in My Veins: Guyana and the Politics of 
Cultural Struggle. Durham: Duke University Press. 
 
Consilience Mullenite: Guyana’s Coastal Drainage 
Williams, D. (2003). Prehistoric Guiana. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers. 
 
Williams, P. (1995). ‘Drainage and Irrigation Projects in Guyana: Environmental 
Considerations.; In Environment and Development in the Caribbean: Geographical 
Perspectives, Barker, D. and D. McGregor (eds), 233–46. Kingston: University 
of the West Indies Press. 
 
Williams, P. and L. Johnson-Bhola (2009). ‘An Investigation into the Causes and 
Consequences of Coastal Flooding in Guyana.’ In Global and Caribbean 
Vulnerability: Environment, Economy, and Society at Risk, McGregor, D., D. 
Dodman, and D. Barker (eds), 74–99. Kingston: University of the West 
Indies Press. 
 
Winner, L. (1989). The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High 
Technology. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
